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Brassey's Law and the Economy of High 
Wages in Nineteenth-Century Economics 
Ray Petridis 
The wages of labour are the encouragement of industry, which, like 
every other human quality, improves in proportion to the encourage-
ment it receives. Where wages are high, accordingly we shall always 
find  the workmen more active, diligent and expeditious than where 
they are low.-Adam Smith, Wealth of  Nations 
Recently the search by economists for a satisfactory explanation of  cycli-
cal variations in involuntary unemployment has returned to analyses of 
the dependence of labor prodnctivity on the real wage. These so-called 
efficiency-wage hypotheses suggest that it would be rational for profit-
maximizing firms to pay their workers real wages in excess of  the market-
clearing wage in order to minimize labor cost per efficiency unit. There 
are a variety of channels throngh which higher real wages may inflnence 
productivity,  and, conseqnently, a plethora of efficiency-wage models 
have been developed. Some of these models have direct antecedents, es-
pecially in the internal labor market literature of labor economics and 
in earlier attempts to explain wage rigidity in macroeconomics (Akerlof 
and Yellen 1986; Katz 1986). 
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In the contemporary literature, the origins of the efficiency-wage hy-
pothesis are rarely traced back beyond the well-known contribution in 
development economics by Harvey Leibenstein (1957). This article ac-
cepts that the dominant conceptual idea in such theories is the existence 
of  a causal link between real wages and productivity of  labor. There is no 
presumption that the writings of  earlier economists precisely anticipated 
contemporary efficiency-wage theories. In particular, earlier writers did 
not possess the theoretical apparatus relating to involuntary unemploy-
ment and a less than fUll-employment equilibrium, although this article 
will show that some of them linked together higher wages, increases in 
productivity of labor, and increased unemployment. 
The conuection between high wages and the productivity of labor 
seems  to  have been recognized by writers  down through the ages.  I 
demonstrate below that, based on their business experience, "practical" 
economists (the amateurs) strongly subscribed to such views. Some pro-
fessional British and American economists were undoubtedly influenced 
by these amateurs and espoused similar views with varying degrees of 
rigor. It  will be seen that in the period spanning the marginal revolution, 
the concept of  higher wages leading to increased labor productivity posed 
some analytical problems for professionals theorizing about equilibrium. 
This article is organized around the idea of Brassey's Law in order to 
emphasize the influence of aruateurs on the analysis by the profession-
als of wages and productivity in the nineteenth century. The term was 
named after Lord Thomas Brassey, who described how in widely differ-
ent geographic, social, political, and economic circumstances workers 
produced approximately the same amount of output per wage unit, re-
gardless of the actual wage. It was aruateur economists, industdalists, 
and outside observers who liberally interpreted Brassey's Law to pro-
duce the generalization that higher real wages may cause increased labor 
productivity. Their discussion was based on the observation that higher 
real wages improve the physical condition of the laborer, an idea which 
has been labeled "the nutrition model" in recent theoretical literature on 
economic development (Dasgupta and Roy 1986, 1987; Bliss and Stern 
1978). Despite the nonrigorous and rudimentary nature ofthe amateurs' 
analyses, their views played a major role in the discussion of the time 
and so had a significant impact on the analyses developed by professional 
ecoTImnists. 
Section I provides the background to the late-nineteenth-century dis-
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of earlier views on the issue, followed by the influential contribution of 
an amateur writing about the situation in Ireland in the mid-nineteenth 
century. The views of the two most influential amateurs, Brassey and 
Jacob Schoenhof, are examined in section II.  In section Ill, the reac-
tions and extensions to this analysis by J.  E. Cairnes and F.  A. Walker 
provide an early link to the marginal economists and demonstrate the 
impact of the amateurs on the views of the professionals. Section IV 
is devoted entirely to Alfred Marshall's analysis of wages, the standard 
of comfort, and the efficiency of labor; it emphasizes his more rigorous 
approach as well as illustrates the tensions that it caused with regard to 
his marginal theory of distribution. Section V sets out the contribution 
of John A. Hobson, who played a role somewhere between amateur and 
professional. Hobson produced a balanced evaluation of the amateurs' 
views and provided the most insightful exposition of how increases in 
wages engender increases in the productivity of labor. 
I 
The link  between wages and productivity attracted the attention of  writers 
long before the nineteenth century. In his excellent early study of chang-
ing attitudes toward labor and in several related articles, A.  W.  Coats 
(1958, 1971, 1992) demonstrates that in the earlier part of the eighteenth 
century among British economists there was a "growing appreciation that 
high money wages did not necessarily mean high labour costs" (1992, 
72). High wages and increased productivity were therefore linked to-
gether.  In these discussions it was common to examine relative wages 
in Britain and other European countries and relate this to  the relative 
efficiency of labor. The classical economists made similar comparisons 
and invariably drew a contrast between British workers and their Irish 
counterp31ts (Coats 1971, 157). Similar themes recuITed during this pe-
riod, although the role of the amateurs as a catalyst to the discussions of 
the professionals was of greater impOltance. 
In the mid-nineteenth century, comp31"isons were again drawn between 
the relative efficiency oflaborin different countries and between different 
regions of  the S3llle country. Most emphasis was placed on levels of nu-
trition, and pre- and post-famine Ireland was the most discussed country. 
Ireland drew attention because of the widespread view that wages were 
lower there than in most other European countries. An especially impor-
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Kane (1845).1 He noted that, although the daily wage rate in Ireland was 
very low (compared to Britain), a large proportion of  the Irish labor force 
was unemployed for much of the year. Kane stressed a theme that was 
to be expressed repeatedly in subsequent economic analysis: "Nominal 
cheapness [of labor) is, however, by no means necessarily economy in 
final cost" (1845, 397). According to Kane, the Irish laborer who was 
paid lower wages than his British counterpart was  so  physically and 
psychologically depressed that his daily output was also depressed. The 
British worker might be paid double the Irish worker, but his output was 
so much greater that ultimately the unit cost of his labor was not higher. 
Supervision (overseeing) costs were also reduced. Kane provided spe-
cific examples demonstratiug that when Irish workers were paid higher 
wages, their output increased more than proportionately. Data on the rel-
ative efficiency of British and French foundry workers also supported 
his conclusion that "wages ceased to be low precisely as the efficiency 
of work increased. The cheapness of labour is thus shown to be quite 
different from the nominal rate of wages" (1845, 399). 
Knowledge ofthe Irish situation did not lead contemporary economists 
to attempt to develop theoretical structures consonant with the observed 
facts. John Stuart Mill seemed to accept the relationship between wages 
and efficiency uncritically, observing in passing in his Principles that 
"With the rate of wages such as it is iu Ireland, or in England (where, iu 
proportion to its efficiency, labour is quite as cheap as in Ireland) ....  " 
([1871)  1965,249). Mill does not provide a source for this view,  but 
given his deep interest in Irish affairs it reflects an intimate knowledge 
of the condition of the Irish economy2 Nothing is made of this in Mill's 
discussion of wages,3 his main interest being the related problem of the 
impact of the cottier system (the use of land as  a payment for  labor) 
on Irish agricultural labor.  Such low  wages (or high rents)  adversely 
1.  Kane produced a remarkably insightful piece of induclive analysis examining Ireland's 
natural resource base, the characteristics of agriculture,  transpOlt, and the organization and 
economic analysis of lahor and capital. Kane, who was a medical practitioner, delivered the 
lectures to the Royal Dublin Society, and the lectures were published at the Society's behest. 
2. At the time when he was writing the Principles, Mill contributed  forty~three leading articles 
dealing with Irish alIairs to the Morning Chronicle (Mill [18711  1965, lxv). 
3.  Although in his discussion of the detemtination of profits  he again notes, "the cost of 
labour is  frcquently at its highest where wages are lowest," attributing this to  differences in 
efficiency which, he wrote "is proved. .  . by abundant testimony" but is not documented by 
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affect the efficiency of labor and also their motivation to improve that 
efficiency. Mill wished to see the cottier system abolished but stopped 
short of advocating an increase in wages as  a means of increasing the 
efficiency of agricultural laborers. Elsewhere, in discussing the probable 
future of  the laboring classes, Mill notes with approval the profit-sharing 
experiment instituted in Paris by a house painter in the l830s. The painter, 
M. Leclaire, offered his workers higher wages. In this way he succeeded 
in recruiting "excellent workmen" (Mill [1871]1965, 771) who showed 
greater loyalty to his establishment. Supervision of  their work remained a 
problem until their annual incomes were increased yet further by an end-
of-year profit-sharing arrangement. Clearly, Mill accepted that aspects of 
the efficiency of  labor might be improved by higher wages (in addition to 
improvements due to better physical conditions), but he thought that such 
improvements would be associated with greater cooperation between 
capitalists and laborers! Profit sharing and cooperative production were 
the ultimate objectives "if mankind continued to improve" (Mill [1871] 
1965, 775). Unfortunately, despite some experiments in Britain, these 
developments lay in the future, although "in perhaps a less remote future 
than may be supposed" (Mill [1871]1965, 793). 
II 
In the lacuna between the publication of  Mill's Principles and the emer-
gence of  the marginal economists, apart from the wages-fund issue, scant 
attention was paid by economists to the relation between wages and effi-
ciency. But in the rapidly industrializing British economy in the second 
half of  the nineteenth century some "practical men of  business" observed 
an unusual phenomenon. As they paid their workers higher wages, a more 
than proportionate increase in output per worker seemed to be elicited. 
The most important observer of this phenomenon was Thomas Brassey 
(b.  1805-d. 1870), railway contractor to the world, whose observations 
and experiences were recorded and published by his son, Thomas Brassey 
(later Earl Brassey), over a fifty-year span (Brassey 1872; Helps 1872; 
Higgs 1926). 
4. William Thornton discusses Mill's interpretation of the Leclaire practices and adds some 
examples of his own, but his emphasis was on profit sharing, although he insightfully suggests 
that employers "are acting upon a principle ...  that labourers may, by the conditional promise 
of extra remuneration, be stimulated to extra exertion and attention" (Thornton  1870, 389; see 
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While managing a highly profitable construction business through ex-
cellent, if slightly paternalistic, relations with his employees, Brassey 
noticed  a  strong,  positive relationship between his  workers'  pay and 
their productivity. His interest stimulated and his Victorian zeal aroused, 
Brassey hegan to conduct interviews with employees, managers, and sec-
retaries on the relation between their work and wages, supplementing the 
information with some data from other employers. In all, he compiled 
twenty-four volumes of  interviews covering manufacturing, textiles, and 
railway and building construction in Britain, Ireland, Germany, France, 
and India. The results of this research were first published by Brassey's 
son in 1872 under the title Work and Wages.s 
From these data and observations a number of major, but not entirely 
consistent, messages emerged. The central idea was the enunciation of 
Brassey's Law. This was the claimed tendency for output per wage unit to 
be the same everywhere. Brassey regarded this as an impressive propo-
sition with which he wished to persuade other employers to follow his 
wage policies. As will be seen below, the proposition was easily open to 
challenge on logical grounds, although since Brassey was working with 
relatively homogeneous, unskilled labor, one of the obvious defects of 
the analysis was less visible. 
In making his case for  industrialists to pay higher wages, Brassey 
fudged the distinction between the generalization of Brassey's Law and 
the specific propositions associated with the economy of high wages. 
Thus he argued that the payment of high wages did not preclude the firm 
from making large profits because the higher wages would be accom-
panied by increased investment, improved management, and, of course, 
increased work effort from labor. Even the efficiency of unskilled labor 
increased with increased wages as workers responded to improved nu-
trition, which also led to an increased ability on the part of the workers 
to benefit from training. Comparing railway workers in England and In-
dia, Brassey noted that there was an additional reason for the increased 
efficiency of  the English worker-the low cost of  supervision when com-
pared to his Indian counterpart. Reducing hours of work sometimes in-
creased output per worker in the  same way as  an  increase in  wages. 
5. Some of the material in this book is also referred to  in  Helps  1872, cited above, and in 
Lectures on the Labour Question (Brassey 1878). The book was reissued with a new preface 
in  1916 in response to "a few friends, fellow members of the Political Economy Club,"  who 
thought that it would be "useful for the guidance of all who have to deal with the management 
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When he built the Trent Valley railway, Brassey adopted an eight-hour 
day (down from the usual ten-hour day) and used double shifts. The result 
was an increase in output per worker, which comfortably compensated 
for the reduction in hours. This led to the argument that neither the rate of 
wages nor the number of hours worked per day was a true measure of  the 
cost of  labor. He expressed the point in this way: "daily wages affords no 
real measure of  the actual cost of work; and it is quite possible that work 
may be more cheaply executed by the same workmen, notwithstanding 
that their wages have largely increased" (Brassey 1872, 67). 
Brassey's book was favorably received in his small, liberal intellectual 
circle. Favorable reviews appeared in the major periodicals, the Quarterly 
Review (1873), the Edinburgh Review (1872), and the Fortnightly Review 
(1872). The last was written by Frederic Harrison and was an extensive 
review quoting detailed data from a variety of sources and heaping ful-
some praise on Brassey's ideas and practices. The distinction between 
Brassey's Law and the economy of  high wages was ignored by Harrison, 
whose major objective was to promote higher wages and reduced hours 
of work while also mounting an attack on capital. To this end, he poured 
vitriol on the economics profession. "Political economy professes to be a 
science based on observation. But the bitter pedantry which often usurps 
that name usually assumes its facts, after it has rounded off dogmas to 
suit its clients" (Harrison 1872, 268). Apart from J.  E. Cairnes (see be-
low), the response from mainstream economists was muted6  Outside 
the mainstream, popular commentators and some industrialists focused 
on what came to  be regarded as the central message-and which has 
been termed Brassey's Law of wages and productivity." "On my father's 
extensive contracts, carried on in almost every country of the civilised 
world,.  .  . the daily wage of labour was fixed at widely different rates; 
but it was found to be the almost invariable rule that the cost of labour 
was the same in thatfor the same sum of  money, the same amount of  work 
was everywhere peljormed" (Brassey 1872,75; emphasis added). It  was 
more comfortable and convenient to take from this argument the message 
that relative rates of  productivity varied across countries in proportion to 
6. Many years later, F. Y. Edgeworth quoted Brassey's results approvingly but suggested that 
Harrison's "interpretation of the facts stated by Lord Brasscy is remarkable" (Higgs 1926, 176), 
which Edgeworth intended to be taken as dissent from Harrison's vituperative comments (see 
also Edgeworth 1894), 
7. For example, see Howell 1878, which says that "Mr. Brassey has conclusively shown that 
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the rate of wages paid. In the latter half of the nineteenth centnry it was 
easy to demonstrate both that British workers were paid more than their 
counterparts in Europe and that they were correspondingly more efficient 
(see Mundella 1878; Jeans 1884; Chapman 1904). The comparison with 
the United States differed because U.S. wages outstripped British wages, 
but the productivity data suggested that British and American rates were 
similar. 
In the United States amateur economist Jacob Schoenhof (b.  1839-
d.  1903) began to extol the vittues of high wages. For a time, Schoenhof 
served as U.S. consul to England (Higgs 1926,753) and carried out a 
number of investigations of training, education, and working conditions 
in Europe on behalf of Thomas Bayard, U.S. secretary of state. Bayard 
and Schoenhof favored the lowering of the U.S.  tariff, and the mate-
rial gathered by Schoenhof was designed to demonstrate the economic 
benefits of rednced protection. 
By 1885, Schoenhof's ideas crystallized in his book On the industrial 
situation. In that book he focused mainly on liberalizing the labor market 
and reducing tariffs, reaching the conclusion at the end that "our labor, 
assisted by machinery, is so efficient and cheap now, that with free ma-
terials we could advance Our labor price, and still be able to undersell 
European labor in any of the neutral markets of the world" (156). He 
opposed cutting wages in order to meet foreign competition, and rather 
favored the reverse, supporting his argument with copious comparative 
labor cost and output data for the United States, England, Germany, and 
France. He concluded that "countries whose productiveness of  labor has 
attained the highest potency, are those whose earnings and wages are 
highest, and that, inversely, low wages and low productiveness go hand 
in hand" (1885, l7). The causal mechanism according to Schoenhofwas 
from high wages to a high standard of living. Improvements in nutrition 
and the ability to spend income on ancillary goods and services were a 
direct result of the payment of higher wages. In a most telling example, 
Schoenhof compared data for Germany in the fifteenth and seventeenth 
centnries, concluding that both wages and productivity were higher in 
the earlier period. 
There was  some opposition to  Schoenhof's free-trade-high  wage-
prescription, and Schoenhof was removed from his position in the U.S. 
Consular service.8 Undeterred, Schoenhof continued his research and in 
8. See the introduction to Schoenhof (1928, iv) by T. F. Bayard, formerly secretary of  state in 
the Democratic administration. Thirty years later, the Hoover new era administration supported 
high-wage policies, as did some industrialists such as Henry Ford (see Au,<;tin and Lloyd 1926; Petridis / Brassey's Law  591 
1892 published his book with the felicitous title The Economy of  High 
Wages. He quotes Brassey on work and wages approvingly and pursues 
the theme raised in his own earlier work with fresh data and even greater 
vigor. He argues that high wages are not only associated with increased 
efficiency of labor but also with a number of other important benefits. 
Employers can recruit and, more importantly, retain the most skilled la-
bor so that the specific on-the-job training provided is not lost to the 
firms (26-27). He also argues from his own experience in the clothing 
trade that high wages improved the attitude of the workers leading to 
improved efficiency (393-94). Other elements of his argument point to 
an increased incentive for capital-labor substitution and improvements 
in organization and management. Finally, higher wages lead to a rise in 
consumption and increased demand since wage earners are numerically 
the largest class. 
Like Brassey, Schoenhof's views might be classified as those of an 
enlightened, somewhat paternalistic, and radical conservative. The anal-
yses of both men relied on what F.  Y.  Edgeworth called "the inductive 
patts of  political economy" (1894, 688), so their collection, alTangement, 
and use of data supplemented by long and detailed anecdotal evidence 
was easily open to challenge. Both also took a strong polemical stance, 
with Schoenhof in particulat· presenting a powerful and, at times, biased 
case for the pursuit of free trade. One line of attack was for academic 
economists to question the data and the bias of the authors. But if  any 
validity was conceded to their inductive analysis, the challenge still re-
mained of demonstrating how the academic theoretical models could 
explain the data. 
III 
Among British economists one of the strongest early reactions to Bras-
sey's book Work  and Wages  carne from J.  E.  Cairnes,  an economist 
who, despite the early developments in marginal analysis, remained very 
much in the pre-neoclassical, historical mold. Cairnes wielded consider-
able authority, especially over English economics, until the mid-1870s, 
and he endeavored to use this authority to demolish what he regarded 
as the crude, inductive analysis of wages and efficiency propounded by 
Barber 1985; Ruff and Summers 1987). It has been suggested by Chris Nyland (1989) that the 
high-wage policies were motivated by lahor shortages and that the major factor increasing effi-
ciency was the dramatic rationalization of production methods under the impetus of "scientific 
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Brassey.  There had been a number of favorable reviews of Brassey's 
book, but it was the one by Harrison (1872) that stung Cairnes into ac-
tion. Harrison accepted Brassey's data and arguments unquestioningly 
and concluded that "with evidence like this before us, we may well hesi-
tate to accept the professional dicta of so-called economists" (regarding 
the links among wages, productivity, profits, and costs; 278). Because 
Cairnes was one of  the economists who clung to a watered-down version 
of the wages-fnnd theory after Mill's recantation, he felt compelled to 
mount a strong attack on the Brassey-Harrison position. Using somewhat 
sarcastic language, Cairnes described as  "simple" the argument "that it 
often pays better to employ a good workman at high wages, than an infe-
rior one at low" (1874, 281). He claimed that it was "an indubitable fact" 
and not a refutation of all that economists have written on the relation 
of wages to  profits.  But he was unprepared to go beyond this to "the 
implicit economic law" that the efficiency of labor varies with its price. 
Cairnes's counterargument missed the point because he based it on the 
central proposition that wages paid are constrained by competition. This 
hardly constituted a refutation but rather a misinterpretation, because 
Brassey never suggested that his analysis was ruled out in competitive 
labor markets. Furthermore, Cairnes conceded considerable ground by 
his argument that the link between labor efficiency and wages may only 
hold for unskilled physical work, linking the argument to the standard of 
living. This was after all the base and the starting point for the develop-
ment of Brassey's position. 
In the United States, among academic economists only Francis A. 
Walker developed a concerted analysis of the links between wages and 
labor efficiency. Walker was a critic of laissez-faire and a supporter of 
limited state intervention, a trenchant critic of those who subscribed to 
the wages-fund doctrine. In  ironic style, he used the views of  J. E. Cairnes 
as the starting point for developing his critique of economics after 1870. 
His most important contributions were made in his two books, The Wages 
Question (1876) and Political Economy (1887). Walker was outside the 
two main schools of economic thought of the time, the English and the 
German, while his own technique of analysis was relatively rudimentary 
and, to some extent, atheoretical. 
The demolition of the wages-fund doctrine was the starting point for 
Walker's analysis of the links between wages and labor efficiency. By 
today's standards his analysis was both insightful and enlightened and 
did not confuse Brassey's Law with the economy of high wages. Wages 
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determined dietary standards, which in turn determiued the efficiency 
of labor, according to Walker.  He demonstrated a detailed knowledge 
of the Irish situation and  made reference to  Brassey's evidence on the 
impact of wages on the efficiency of English workers relative to Rus-
sian, French, and Indian workers (1887, 55-56, 368-69). Increases in 
wages not only improve dietary standards but also lead directly or indi-
rectly to better hygiene and living conditions and to a greater investment 
by workers in their own training. "It is possible tbat an employer may 
pay high wages, and yet the cost of labor to him may prove to be low, 
by reason of tbe laborer's supelior efficiency" (1887, 248). In his more 
comprehensive analysis in The Wages Question, Walker argued that the 
payment of higher wages allowed employers to maintain continuity in 
production linked to continuity of employment. These turnover-reducing 
effects were in tbe interests of employers because of on-the-job training 
and the acquisition of  specific skills-"mutual adaptation" and the work-
men's acquired knowledge of "tbe peculiarities of his employer's busi-
ness, which is wholly additional to tbe mastery of  the technicalities of  the 
occupation" (1876, 300-1). Selection of the most desirable employees 
was also facilitated by the payment of high wages; this was reflected in 
the fact that tbe least senior workers, whose wages were usually lower, 
were laid off first (301). 
The insights from Walker's analysis range over many of those found 
in modern efficiency-wage theories and the related analyses of the oper-
ation of internal labor markets. An especially telling argument was tbat 
employers may pay higher wages for efficiency reasons, but that tbey 
need not pay as much because of tbe specificity of  the skills involved. So 
wages may not rise "proportionately to tbeir work" because although "the 
workman may take from him [tbe employer] these advantages [specific 
knowledge and skills] he can not carry themlo anyone else" (1876, 302). 
And he even anticipated the possibility that wages above the market-
clearing level would generate unemployment because employers "could 
not afford for a short time to  take on new hands even at lower rates" 
(1876,302). Thus, "simple competition" is negated in this case. 
At the aggregate level, Walker predicted tbe possibility of unemploy-
ment. Reductions in wages would not only lower the efficiency of labor, 
they would also lead to lost output, which could not be recovered. Al-
though he ruled out the possibility of overproduction, he argued tbat 
underconsumption was more than likely and injurious (1876, 286-87, 
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1ytical framework. His strong criticism of David Ricardo, Cairnes, and 
the "English" economists in general, his espousal of a modified form of 
Malthusianism, and his rejection of  laissez-faire economics all combined 
to render Walker's views less palatable to the economics profession. 
IV 
Alfred Marshall must have read Brassey's Work and Wages  soon after 
it was  published in  1872;  by  May of the following  year he  was rec-
ommending the book to the women attending his Lectures to Women 9 
Marshall made brief summaries of the main chapters of Brassey's book, 
focusing on the statistical evidence and emphasizing the link between 
wages and the "physical condition of labour" ("Earnings Theory 1-
Labour and Theory of Wages," Marshall Papers).l0 By 1874 Marshall 
had commenced work on a monograph on international trade. 11  Despite 
Marshall's description of this writing as  "crnde" (Whitaker 1975, 2:7), 
the analysis is clear and logically set out. Higher wages may be spent in 
improving the quality and quantity of the laborer's food, raising the effi-
ciency oflabor with a lag of  a year or so. Over the course of  a generation, 
improved nutrition would also be linked with greater opportnnities for 
education and training, thus leading to "increased efficiency in the next 
generation" (2:24). Without directly referring to Brassey, an argument 
is presented that "foreign trade competition tends to equalise the money 
wages of the same task performed with the same efficiency, in different 
countries" (Whitaker 1975, 2:30). Here the analysis becomes somewhat 
convoluted, but as Whitaker notes (2:25), by the time of the publication 
of Economics of  Industry (1879),  Marshall had clarified his thoughts 
on the issue. One other highly significant featnre of the discussion of 
9. This was a nonuniversity lecture scheme intended to educate women otherwise excluded 
from Cambridge University. Marshall wrote brief  notes on the books he recommended in order 
to guide the students' reading (see Lee/ures to Women, May 1873, Marshall Papers). 
10. In the 1870s, Marshall also kept cuttings from the Daily News and the Times of the public 
reporting of Brassey's book and lectures. The empha"is in the public discussion was all the 
apparently superior efficiency of the "English" worker (see Miscellaneous Box 81, Population, 
Efficiency of Labour, Marshall Papers). The earliest reference by Marshall to the impact of a 
"real rise in wages" on laborers, who "by raising their physical and mental vigour increase the 
gross producc" may be iound in a mathematical fragment dated between 1867 and  1872 (see 
Whitaker 1975, 2:275-77). 
11.  Portions of this were published privately by Henry Sidgwick with Marshall's consent 
(see Whitaker 1975, vol.  I for details; the material on wages and efficiency is in part 1, chap. 4, 
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wages and nutrition in Marshall's foreign trade chapters is the repeated 
stipulation that in the analysis of labor, "account" should be "taken of 
its efficiency" (Whitaker 1975, 2:22, 24). At this point Marshall had not 
fully developed his theory of distJibution, but this was an early and clear 
recognition that a link between wages and efficiency was likely to com-
plicate the analysis.I2 If the efficiency of labor is a function of the wage 
level, then it is both a cause and effect of higher wages. Marginal pro-
ductivity is not uniquely determined, implying that there may be more 
than one equilibJium position. 
The possibility of multiple equilibJia represented both a problem, and 
in its resolution, a prospect for richer insights into economic processes. 
It was, therefore, reserved by  Marshall for his growth volume, which 
he was already planning even before the publication of volume I of the 
Principles (Whitaker 1974). What he wrote about wages and efficiency 
in a static context in his Economics of  Industry (1879) and Principles of 
Economics (1890) seems to have been hedged about to some extent.13 
There can be no doubt that Marshall, in developing the link between 
wages and efficiency, relied on the work of  his predecessors, at least back 
to Adam Smith, some of whom assumed that higher incomes increased 
work effort as living standards rose and the laborer strove to widen the 
range of goods consumed. As Marshall's version of the marginal pro-
ductivity theory of distJibution evolved, he developed an approach that 
accommodated vaJiations in the efficiency of labor as  wages rose. The 
central concept was propounded in the Economics of  Industry (1879; 
written jointly with Maty Paley Marshall), in which they distinguished 
between "time wages-the wages that a man earns in a day" and "task 
wages-the wages that are paid to him for doing a given amount of work 
of a given quality" ([1879]1881, 101). A Jise in time wages measured in 
real terms, Marshall stressed, usually increases the standard of COmfOlt 
and therefore the health and nutrition of  cun-ent workers and, in addition, 
the nurture (including sldlls and education) of  future generations. A Jise 
in the efficiency oflabor automatically followed. Symmetrically, a fall in 
wages when the level of wages was already low would lower the standard 
of comfort and efficiency of labor (Marshall and Marshall [1879J 1881, 
12. In an earlier essay on wages (1870-74) Marshall assumed in his analysis that laborers 
were "in full bodily efficiency" (Whitaker 1975, 1:196). When subsequently he developed his 
distribution theory, he treated units of labor as homogeneous in terms of their efficiency. 
13. Whitaker suggests that "a complex theory of economic growth which has largely gone 
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102). This latter argument is supported with reference to Walker's book 
The Wages Question but Marshall makes no specific acknowledgment to 
Walker for the arguments presented. This may be explicable by the pe-
culiarly ethical requirement Marshall makes-a rise in wages must lead 
to a rise, more or less permanent, in the standard of comfort. This calls 
for "appropriate" behavior on the part of the laborer and of the laborer's 
family. 
In general Marshall tbought that laborers would spend their increased 
time wages in such a way as to increase the standard of  comfort and labor 
efficiency.  Thus efficiency of labor is  rendered  endogenous, creating 
difficulties of analysis in a static framework. There was no attempt on 
Marshall's part to avoid these difficulties by arguing that simultaneous 
increases in wages and labor efficiency were exceptional. On the contrary, 
he argued the reverse (Marshall and Marshall [1879]1881, 132). The way 
out was simply to take the time wage and its associated task wage as given 
at any point in time. It  is the past average time wage that is the object of 
analysis-at any point in time exceptional workers may receive a higher 
time wage which "may be regarded as  a kind of rent"  (Marshall and 
Marshall [1879]1881,110). 
When Marshall turned to the writing of the Principles in the 1880s, he 
somewhat tentatively developed his distribution theory, which allowed 
him to refine, but not develop, some of his earlier concepts on wages 
and efficiency. This refinement enabled him to observe that "highly paid 
labour is generally efficient and therefore not dear labour; a fact which 
.  .  . will be found to exercise a very complicating influence on the the-
ory of distribution" (1961,1:510). Presumably the complications arose 
because a rise in wages which changed efficiency meant that labor could 
not simply be measured in physical units, for this would differ from labor 
measured in such a way as to take account of efficiency-that is, labor 
measured in efficiency units. 14 The efficiency of labor would also vary 
for any given task wage according to the quantity and quality of capital 
with which labor worked. So the analysis proceeded on the assumption 
that labor was of "normal" or "standard" efficiency working with capi-
tal of given value, generating the result that the marginal net product of 
labor is equal to its wage. But in progressing from this general theory of 
distribution to the specific explanation of the earrtings of  labor, Marshall 
14. Marshall's problem is clearly discernible in the inherited difficulties 1. Maynard Keynes 
had in choosing appropriate units of measurement for quantities of employment (see Keynes 
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once again snuggled with the concept of efficiency. He turned again to 
the distinction between task and time wages made in the Economics of 
Industry. He defined them in the same way as in that earlier work but after 
the third edition of the Principles renamed task wages "efficiency wages, 
or more broadly efficiency earnings.  .  . , that is, earnings measured.  .  . 
with reference to the exertion of ability and efficiency required" (1961, 
1:549).15 
The ambiguity  of the phrase "efficiency of labor" was not cleared 
away by the use of the term "efficiency wages." In this essentially static 
analysis, Marshall argued that the forces of competition would lead to 
"a tendency to  equality of efficiency  earuings" (1961,  1:549),  which 
he assumed would clear away the difficulties associated with increas-
ing wages leading to changes in efficiency. Here there are allnsions to 
but no  specific reference to Brassey's analysis,  and Marshall repeats 
Brassey's dictnm "that high paid labour is really cheap" (1961, 1:565). 
Modem efficiency-wage-type arguments are then presented, snggesting 
that where expensive machinery is being used and supervision of work 
is important, it wonld pay the employer to offer higher wages. Marshall 
goes even further, snggesting that "it would be to the advantage of the 
employer to raise the time-earnings of the more efficient workers more 
than in proportion to their efficiency" (1961, 1:550).16 This proposition is 
analogous to those made in modern efficiency-wage theories, butthe role 
to be played by competitive forces in generating a tendency to equality 
of efficiency earnings has now been abandoned. In his static framework, 
Marshall was unable to spell out the analytical implications. 
The absence of  a fully articulated dynamic model of  the growth process 
has resulted in  the oversight of  some of  the insights of  Marshall's analysis. 
In the Principles, the last two chapters dealing with economic progress 
were intended to pave the way for Marshall's volume 2 on economic 
growth, a project which he finally  abandoned around 1907. But little 
that is new appears in these chapters as  Marshall repeats the argument 
that rises in wages may increase economic growth and the efficiency of 
15. Most of this material is in the Principles, book 6, chaps. \-5 and 11. Specific references 
to the wages-efficiency relationship may be found on 511, 516,522,528,531-32,546,548-50, 
662,675, and 682-83. 
16. Of  course Marshall may not have regarded this as the most commonly aecuning case, In 
the concluding chapter of the Principles, he again stresses that "the competition of employers 
tends to  adjust wages of labour to  its net product graduated according to efficiency" (1961, 
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labor as  long as  the increased "standard of comfort" is translated into 
a rise in the "standard of life" as  well (1961,  1:690-731). He argues 
that empirical evidence on snch relationships may be unreliable because 
of the simultaneous changes in other economic, industrial, and social 
conditions and also because the long-run outcome may differ from the 
initial impact of any change in wages. In his much-delayed later books, 
especially Industry and Trade, where there was an obvious role for such 
a discussion, Marshall made but passing reference to the links between 
wages and efficiency.  Instead he  preferred to  "modernise" but not to 
enlighten his work with a limpid discussion of  remuneration and scientific 
management (1919, especially 350-54, 368-69, 377-78, 384-88). 
My search through Marshall's published work has revealed numerous 
ideas pointing toward a more substantial analysis of the wages-efficiency 
links. But as Whitaker notes, these "tantalising hints" (1974,  17) seem 
never to have been advanced after the 1880s. Marshall's most coherent 
approach to the issue was written in the early 1880s when he was "ex-
perimenting" (the word is used deliberately) with the formulation ofthe-
aries of growth and distribution. Whitaker has admirably demonstrated 
that Marshall was "a pioneer" in "the neoclassical theory of economic 
growth" (1974,  1)  and that the outlines of the ideas were discernible 
in the Economics of  Industry (1879). Some of the unpublished material 
referred to  in Whitaker 1974 subsequently appears in Whitaker 1975 
(2:305-16). Simple differential calculus is  used to impart a dynamic 
element to Marshall's analysis. The rate of change of labor efficiency 
is assumed by Marshall to depend on the labor force measured in effi-
ciency units, the amount of capital, the state of technology, and on the 
level of time wages. One stage further back, the standard of comfort is 
also changing over time in response to the level of time wages. 
By modern standards Marshall used an elementary approach to  dy-
namic analysis, yet it was  a promising start. That it was tentative and 
experimental may be gauged from the unpublished manuscript printed 
in volume 2 of Whitaker 1975, which shows that Marshall tried several 
functional forms for the main relationships. It  is also clear that he was still 
feeling his way with the reasoning underlying the dynamic formulations. 
Much of it was sketchy; he was often uncertain whether the first deriva-
tives of  various functions would be positive or negative, and sometimes 
he made no attempt to assign a value to them. This can also be seen in a 
small amount of additional unpublished material in the Marshall Papers 
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1975 and referred to above. Unfortunately it is even less coherent and less 
decipherable, but it clearly conveys the uncertainty about this dynamic 
analysis that Marshall felt. 17 
Marshall's contribution therefore consisted of the emphasis he placed 
on the links among wages, the standard of comfort, and the efficiency 
of labor. The connection was stressed throughout the remainder of  Mar-
shall's writing life. It was raised in Marshall's exchanges with witnesses 
in the Royal Commission on Labour (1893-94, especially 245-327) and 
regularly recurs in unpublished material scattered throughout his papers 
right up to 1923. 18 There is uo further advancement of the theory in this 
later material, except perhaps for his mention of the idea prevalent in 
some modern theories that high wages may "attract men of more than 
ordinary efficiency" (Supplementary Notes on Remuneration, etc., Mis-
cellaneous Box 2, Marshall Papers). Without doubt Marshall's analysis 
of the wages-efficiency links was more rigorous than the analyses of  oth-
ers who expressed the sarne ideas, yet his approach led him to accept the 
empiIical evidence, especially Brassey's, without subjecting the nature 
of the relationships to closer sClUtiny. 
v 
John A. Hobson (b.  1858-d. 1940) was never admitted to the hallowed 
circle of academic economists apparently because of his early heretical 
underconsumption views, followed later by his rejection of laissez-faire 
competitive  economics and  his  consistent attacks  on the  conservative 
views of the classical economists (Cole 1940; Brailsford 1948; Hobson 
[1909]1974, [1938]1976; Freeden 1990). Such an attack on "the leading 
English economists of the first half of the nineteenth centmy" ([1894] 
1926,352) is the springboard for the development of his exposition of 
the economy of  high wages. These economists preached "the doctrine of 
the economy of  low wages" (353), reinforcing the views and practices of 
17. It is almost voyeuristic for the historian of economic thought to be poking around in the 
obviously preliminary musings of a deceased economist and to be noting every tentative idea, 
every trial and its abandonment, and every scratching out. In Marshall's case it may be justified 
by his avowed objective  La  write  a volume on dynamic economics, which if it  had come to 
fruition may have rivaled his Principles. 
18. Several examples dated variously  1902,  1905, and 1923 may be found in Miscellaneous 
Box 2, Marshall Papers_ This material was apparently assembled for inclusion  in the planned 
volume 2 of the Pn-ndp/es, which was  to  deal with the analysis of growth (77le  Conditions of 
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the business community. But in the last decade of the nineteenth century, 
it was the published experiences ofBrassey and Schoenhofthat provided 
Hobson with some of the empirical evidence to support his theoretical 
analysis of the wages-efficiency link. 
Although Hobson vigorously attacked the proponents of the "dogma 
of the economy of cheap labour" (352) from Ricardo onward, he did 
not uncritically accept the empirical evidence and arguments of Brassey 
in Britain and Schoenhof and Walker in the United States. Specifically, 
Hobson subjected to close scrutiny Brassey's Law "that, for a given class 
of work,  there is a fixed and uniform relation between wages and effi-
ciency of labour for different lands and different races" (Hobson [1894] 
1926, 356). At the outset there was one glaring statistical deficiency in 
Brassey's analysis, which did not allow for differences in purchasing 
power between countries. It was purchasing power that determined the 
standard of living, which in tum affected the efficiency of labor. Only 
if one or the other of two specific assumptions held was it possible to 
rescne Brassey's Law. The first was a strictly linear relation between the 
worker's consumption and "output of productive energy" ([1894]1926, 
356) in which these are determined by the rate of wages in each country. 
It was an assumption easily dismissed by Hobson, for he observed that 
apart from wages, the efficiency of labor depended additionally on  at 
least "race, climate and social environment" (356). The second assump-
tion called for perfect mobility of  capital and labor, and it was summarily 
dismissed. Thus, Brassey's Law fails to hold, but Hobson still argued that 
Brassey's evidence and analysis nevertheless supported "a  general theory 
ofthe economy of  high wages" ([1894]1926, 357). Hobson thought that 
the cOlTelation between high wages and efficient labor was accepted too 
readily by Brassey and other writers, "without attempting scientifically 
to explain the connection" (358). He set out to redress this deficiency 
with a thorough review of the empirical evidence for the United States, 
Britain, Europe, and India. 
Although he concluded that higher wages usually led to an increased 
standard of living and a rise in the efficiency of labor, the relationship 
was by no means immutable. In  some cases the  direction of causation 
was reversed. Even if the link was from wages to productivity of labor, 
there were limits to the profitable increase of wages. Withont nsing the 
jargon of economists, he presented an analysis concluding that the fac-
tor proportions associated with the firm's production function helped to 
determine these limits. Increases in efficiency accompanying a rise in 
wages in some conditions of  production may not lead to an increase suf-Petridis I Brassey's Law  601 
ficientl y large to compensate the firm. In this case, higher wages generate 
increased efficiency and lower profitability for the firm. Hobson recog-
nized the central difficulty of the ceteris paribus methodology that is 
involved by stressing that the relationship between wages and efficiency 
ran in both directions so that it was "clearly one of  mutual determination" 
([1894]1926,368). 
The analysis was more complex when the methods of production in-
volved labor cooperating with machinery. In such cases, it was conceiv-
able that the payment of higher wages might elicit a rise in efficiency, 
"but the price of labour measured in terms of effort" (369) might also 
be higher.  Hobson develops  an argument suggesting that work effort 
may increase as wages rise, especially if  skills and physical capabilities 
increase with the wage. There is a limit to the ability of workers to de-
liver increased work effort as wages rise. The reasoning seems analogous 
to that underlying R. Solow's well-known article (1979), showing that 
profit-maximizing firms  will hire labor and pay a real wage so that the 
elasticity of work effort with respect to the wage is unity. This is the effi-
ciency wage. Beyond that wage, work effort will begin to decline, which 
is precisely the analytical argument made by Hobson. "It would clearly 
be impossible by a number of rapid reductions of the working day and 
increases of time wages to force the effectiveness of an hour's labour 
beyond a certain limit for the workers" ([1894]  1926, 370). However, 
this limit could be interpreted as referring to a physical maximum and 
not to one dictated by profit maximization. 
To a large extent, Hobson expected the amount of work effort elicited 
by a higher wage to  be limited by physiological factors.  This was  an 
"objective economic question." Clearly he did not perceive the situation 
as one in which shirking was the nOilli. However, he thought the "sub-
jective economic question" of the worker's response to having to deliver 
greater work effort in return for a higher wage was also relevant.l9 Higher 
wages are often associated with new wants and an increased demand for 
leisure time to  be devoted to  consumption. Yet  the higher wages may 
call for work effort of such intensity that it renders the worker incapable 
of effectively utilizing leisure time.
20 Even if the incentive to increased 
work effort was absent, there remained the macroeconomic argument 
19. When he examined the comparative wage-efficiency data for various countries, Hobson 
speculated that the high productivity of  workers in the United States could equally be explained 
by "psychical factors"  (l1894] 1926,363) in addition to the physiological ones. 
20. Hobson regarded the link between wages and work eiIart as of limited applicability to 
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that increased wages may stimulate aggregate demand. Here Hobson was 
linking his case for high wages to his well-known underconsumption the-
sis. Higher wages imply a redistribution of income toward workers who 
would spend the extra income, which would otherwise have been saved. 
That is,  certain classes having already satisfied their "normal healthy 
wants" (Hobson [1894]  1926,375) refuse to exert "their power to con-
sume" and instead "insist upon storing it in unneeded forms of capital 
(which was) directly responsible for the slack of employment and capi-
tal" (375). It followed that "the surest support of the  'economy of high 
wages' is the conviction that it will operate as  a stimulus to  industry 
through increased consumption" (377). 
In his subsequent and prolific writing, Hobson did not develop the anal-
ysis much further. However, he always wrote as if the economy of high 
wages was an established proposition not requiring further elaboration 
(see Hobson 1910; 1911; 1914; 1922a; 1922b; and 1927 for examples). 
Hobson began to  regularly use the phrase "wage of efficiency" to  de-
scribe the wage that not only satisfied the worker's physiological needs 
but was also sufficient to evoke the worker's will to work. This wage of 
efficiency was one that "an intelligent employer will in his own interest 
pay" (1927, 51; see also 1922a, 88-89; 1910,68-69). But he also stood 
by  his  view that there are always limits to  the increases in efficiency 
higher wages can evoke and that these limits differ for every firm21 
VI 
Discussions of the economy of high wages in the nineteenth century 
were shaped by the influential writings of the amateur economists. These 
practical men of affairs-these amateurs-most strongly supported the 
existence of a causal link from higher wages to increased productivity 
of labor. At times they conflated the concepts of Brassey's Law and the 
economy of high wages. Academic economists who were aware of the 
writings of Brassey and Schoenhof were somewhat more careful and 
rigorous in this respect.  In the United States, F.  A.  Walker adopted a 
sounder theoretical base,  although not an especially rigorous one.  In 
21. In his book, The Conditions of  Industrial Peace, he analyzed the case of Henry Ford's 
motor company to illustrate the point (1927,59), A recent interesting analysis examines whether 
Henry Ford paid efficiency wages (see Raff and Summers 1987). A systematic review of pre-
efficiency wage theory contributions in the twentieth century has not yet been produced, but 
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Britain, the influence of the amateurs can be seen on Alfred Marshall, 
who provided the most rigorous approach, grounding his analysis on the 
distinction between task wages and time wages. Marshall was compelled 
to adapt his methodology in order to deal with the complications caused 
for  marginal productivity theory by a perceived link between higher 
wages and increased efficiency of labor. Much of the most interesting 
material by Marshall is in his unpublished manuscripts, where it emerges 
that he was attempting to place the wages-efficiency analysis in a dynamic 
context. 
Paradoxically, J. A. Hobson, the academic outcast, produced the most 
convincing analysis.  He effectively refuted the assertion of Brassey's 
Law that there was a fixed relationship between wages and efficiency 
across countries and peoples and, at the same time, provided analytical 
support for the economy of  high wages. Hobson developed the important 
insight that there was a point beyond which any additional increase in 
wages would be associated with a less than compensating increase in the 
efficiency of  labor. Although he was prepared to generalize the economy 
of high wages as a guide to welfare-increasing wages policy, he never-
theless argued consistently that there were always significant exceptions 
to the generalization. This aspect of his views would hardly have enam-
ored him to those in the union movement who supported higher wage 
claims, reduced hours, and the eight-hour day with implicit or explicit 
reference to the economy of high wages. Chief among this group were 
Sydney and Beatrice Webb (see Webb and Webb [1894]  1920; [1897] 
1920; [1902]  1920). In his evidence before the Royal Commission on 
Labour (1893-94), when he was questioned by Alfred Marshall, Webb 
argued cautiously that a rise in wages would not necessarily lead to a 
rise in costs of production (1893-94, 322) because of a likely increase 
in efficiency.22 The role played by the development of the economy of 
high wages in the important debate on wages and hours of work at that 
time warrants detailed investigation. 
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